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ABSTRACT
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano highlighted severe con-
ceptual tensions between the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which protects individuals from racial discrimination, and disparate impact liability,
which protects racial groups from adverse effects. Last year’s Supreme Court decision
in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc. suggested that disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act was
constitutionally unproblematic because successful fair housing lawsuits over the past
four decades have led to only race-neutral remedial orders enjoining the practice
causing the disparate impact.
This Article analyzes the constitutionality of another disparate impact remedy: the
imposition of racial quotas. Employment lawsuits brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 have resulted in such remedies, potentially opening the door to
an as-applied constitutional challenge arguing that the remedies violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The outcome will likely hinge upon the standard of review. Many
have argued that a deferential standard is appropriate in light of federal court deci-
sions approving the use of race in census questionnaires, suspect descriptions, and
school zoning. This Article challenges that notion and argues that the proper stan-
dard is strict scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit racial
discrimination in employment.1 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 seven years later, the
Supreme Court read the law as imposing liability for disparate impact: facially neu-
tral actions that were not intended to be discriminatory, but resulted in discriminatory
effects.3 In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to codify the standard set out in Griggs
and allowed a plaintiff to establish an initial showing of disparate impact liability
based on statistical disparities in outcomes between racial groups.4
Yet, liability based on statistics alone raises significant constitutional problems.5
Although the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with the rights of individuals,6
disparate impact liability is triggered by disparities between racial groups.7 And, like
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)).
2 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3 Id. at 431.
4 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)).
5 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 493, 509–15 (2003) [hereinafter Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact].
6 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not groups”).
7 See infra Part I.
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affirmative action programs that the Supreme Court has invalidated over the past four
decades,8 a statute restricting racially disparate impacts is a race-conscious mecha-
nism designed to reallocate opportunities from some racial groups to others.9 These
concerns culminated in Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano, which asked
“[w]hether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII . . .
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”10 The Supreme Court
partially answered this question in Texas Department of Housing & Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,11 in which it hinted that some applica-
tions of disparate impact liability were constitutionally permissible.12 In that case, the
Court interpreted the Fair Housing Act (enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968) to include a cause of action for disparate impact.13 It explained that race-
neutral remedies of the sort that had been applied in fair housing cases over the last
four decades were constitutionally unproblematic,14 but warned that remedial orders
requiring racial targets or quotas might raise constitutional problems.15
Those sorts of remedies can result from Title VII lawsuits. For example, one
consent decree in a Title VII disparate impact lawsuit ordered the defendant to hire
“12 African American applicants and 18 Hispanic applicants from the . . . 2012
hiring process.”16 The district court in the case foreclosed the possibility of an equal
protection challenge when it prevented the firefighters’ union from intervening in
the lawsuit, leaving open the question of whether a court would review the racial quota
listed therein under strict scrutiny17 or a deferential, rational-basis standard.18
Part I of this Article recounts the history of disparate impact liability, the consti-
tutional problems with the theory, and the potential for an as-applied challenge to the
use of remedial racial quotas in Title VII disparate impact cases. Part II shows why this
is a difficult question. It examines court rulings on the census,19 the use of race in
8 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003) (invalidating the University of
Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action program).
9 Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 494.
10 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
12 Id. at 2522.
13 Id. at 2518–19 (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 804(a),
805(a), 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a) (2012))).
14 See id. at 2522.
15 See id.
16 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Austin, No. 1:14-CV-00533-LY, at app. D
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2014).
17 See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analy-
sis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006) (comparing strict
scrutiny and rational-basis review).
18 See Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (applying a strong presump-
tion of validity to laws reviewed under the standard).
19 See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 814–15 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
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suspect descriptions,20 school zoning,21 and fair housing22 to show why some scholars
have argued that disparate impact liability does not raise significant constitutional
problems, regardless of how it is applied.23 Those commentators contend that the
standard of review is determined by the normative reasonableness of the law, and
a court may apply deferential review whenever it concludes that a law is desirable.24
Part III demonstrates why that is not so. It shows why cases on the census, suspect
descriptions, school zoning, and fair housing are fully consistent with requiring strict
scrutiny of explicit racial quotas contained in disparate impact remedial orders. In
doing so, I will draw on four principles distilled from key equal protection cases:
burden allocation, expressive harm, universalism, and context.
I. DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provisions: A Brief History
In 1868, the nation ratified the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”25 For the next century, America struggled to live
up to that promise. Through infamous Jim Crow laws, which explicitly differentiated
between races, state and local governments authorized racial discrimination in
virtually every facet of life.26
20 See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
816 (2001).
21 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–11
(2007).
22 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2513 (2015).
23 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1331 (2011) [hereinafter
Siegel, From Colorblindness].
24 Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 509–15.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Federal Government must also guarantee the equal
protection of the laws. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (interpreting the
Fifth Amendment as including an implicit requirement of equal protection).
26 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 393 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In the wake of Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896)], many States expanded their Jim Crow laws, which had up until that time been
limited primarily to passenger trains and schools. The segregation of the races was extended
to residential areas, parks, hospitals, theaters, waiting rooms, and bathrooms. There were
even statutes and ordinances which authorized separate phone booths for Negroes and
whites, which required that textbooks used by children of one race be kept separate from
those used by the other, and which required that Negro and white prostitutes be kept in
separate districts.”).
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In 1962, travelers at train stations were escorted to different waiting rooms designed
to separate whites and blacks.27 Restaurants hung signs saying “whites only” and “no
blacks allowed.”28 Southern states bent on curbing minority participation in voting
“came up with new ways to discriminate as soon as existing ones were struck down.”29
It was no different with employment. In the early 1960s, mining companies dis-
criminated against black coal miners “wherever coal was mined.”30 Employers inten-
tionally sparked racial hostilities by providing less experienced Polish workers with
preferential treatment.31 Black workers in all professions were forced into undesir-
able positions with little chance at earning promotions.32
In recognition of these problems, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1964.33 Title II of the Act dealt with discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion.34 Title VII sought to remedy discrimination in employment.35 The statute made
it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin,”36 or “to limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee”37 for those reasons. The statute unambiguously imposed
liability for “disparate treatment,” also known as intentional discrimination.38 There
was, however, an open question as to whether the law implicitly imposed liability
for actions that resulted in an adverse effect on a protected group, but were taken
without any invidious purpose.
27 See STEVEN D. CLASSEN, WATCHING JIM CROW: THE STRUGGLES OVER MISSISSIPPI
TV, 1955–1969, at 87 (2004).
28 RUTH THOMPSON-MILLER, JOE R. FEAGIN & LESLIE H. PICCA, JIM CROW’S LEGACY:
THE LASTING IMPACT OF SEGREGATION 43–44 (2014).
29 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013).
30 REMEMBERING JIM CROW: AFRICAN AMERICANS TELL ABOUT LIFE IN THE SEGRE-
GATED SOUTH 236 (William H. Chafe et al. eds., 2001).
31 Id. at 236–37.
32 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
708 (2006).
33 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)).
34 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969) (“Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted
a sweeping prohibition of discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion,
or national origin at places of public accommodation whose operations affect commerce.”).
35 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006) (“Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination . . . .”).
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
37 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
38 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (equating disparate treatment
with intentional discrimination).
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As originally enacted, Title VII did not expressly create a cause of action for
disparate impact.39 There is also good evidence that those who enacted the law did
not intend to do so.40 The bill’s sponsors explained that “[t]here is no requirement
in title VII that employers abandon bona fide qualification tests [whenever] . . .
members of some groups [were] able to perform better on these tests than members
of other groups.”41 Senator Hubert Humphrey added that the statutory text made it
“wholly clear that inadvertent or accidential [sic] discriminations will not violate”
Title VII, and promised to eat “the pages one after another” if any Senator could find
language requiring an employer to “hire on the basis of percentage or quota related
to color [or] race.”42 But in 1971, the Supreme Court decided otherwise.43
1. Griggs
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court created a disparate impact cause of action
in Title VII.44 The employer in the case had openly discriminated against minority
applicants,45 and the changes that it made after Title VII went into effect were blatant
attempts to evade the statute’s requirements.46 The employer’s test for new appli-
cants, which had replaced a system of forthright discrimination against minorities,
was designed for those with a high school education—and administered at a time when
most blacks did not go to high school.47 Although the tests at issue in Griggs strongly
suggested disparate treatment, the Court’s endorsement of disparate impact liability
39 See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010).
40 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1541 (2003) (“In construing especially controversial [disparate impact] pro-
visions of Title VII, the Court rested its decisions on dubious pieces of legislative history.”).
41 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (memorandum of Sens. Case & Clark).
42 Id. at 6549, 7420, 12723–24 (statements of Sen. Humphrey).
43 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII pro-
scribed “not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation”).
44 Id.; see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[Griggs], which concluded that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes plaintiffs to bring disparate-impact claims, represents the
triumph of an agency’s preferences over Congress’ enactment and of assumption over fact.”
(citations omitted)).
45 See Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Dis-
parate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 659 (2015) [hereinafter Siegel,
Race-Conscious].
46 Id.
47 Selmi, supra note 32, at 716. Griggs was also decided at a time when the Court lacked
a tool to smoke out intentional discrimination in facially neutral statutes. Since Griggs, the
Court created the test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
to do just that in Title VII claims, and the test set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to do so in constitutional claims.
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in that case pervades employment discrimination law today. The Court held that once
the plaintiff established that a business practice had an adverse effect on a protected
group, the employer was required to demonstrate that the practice was necessary to
its business.48
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Court retreated from this stringent standard on employers over the next 20
years. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,49 the Court reduced the employer’s burden
to rebut a showing of disparate impact liability.50 Employers were no longer required
to demonstrate that an employment test was “essential” or “indispensable” to its
business,51 but only that it significantly furthered a legitimate business purpose.52
Congress abrogated the Wards Cove test with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
returned disparate impact liability to the strict standards set forth in Griggs.53 The
statute governs disparate impact claims today:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this title only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a par-
ticular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respon-
dent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job re-
lated for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity . . . .54
Disparate impact litigation can last up to three rounds. First, plaintiffs can make
an initial showing (or establish a prima facie case) of disparate impact liability by
showing that the employer used “a particular employment practice that cause[d] a
disparate impact.”55 Employment practices include background checks, credit checks,
and pen-and-paper tests.56 According to the Equal Employment and Opportunity
48 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
49 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991), as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
50 See id. at 656–61.
51 Id. at 659.
52 Id.
53 See § 105, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012)).
54 Id.
55 Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 212 (2010) (quoting Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 105, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i))).
56 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 464–65 (4th Cir. 2015)
(in which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleged that background
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Commission, a selection rate57 of less than 80% “of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evi-
dence of adverse impact.”58
For instance, an employer may use a pen-and-paper test and hire every applicant
who scores above a certain grade. If 80% of white applicants and 72% of black
applicants pass the test, there is no significant adverse effect on black applicants
because the comparative selection rate for blacks was 90%.59 But if 80% of white
applicants and 60% of black applicants pass the test, there is a significant adverse
effect on blacks because the comparative selection rate for blacks was 75%.60
Second, an employer can rebut an initial showing of an adverse effect on a pro-
tected class by convincing the court that the business practice at issue has “a mani-
fest relationship to the employment in question.”61 Also known as the business
necessity standard, an employer might be able to satisfy this requirement if it can
prove that test scores are correlated with job performance.62
Third, if a court holds that the tests at issue are job related, the plaintiff can still
win if it shows that “other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trust-
worthy workmanship’” just as well.63 A plaintiff might win under this element, and
thus prevail in the disparate impact lawsuit, by showing that an oral test would have
been just as effective as a written test in serving the employer’s needs and would have
led to a smaller difference in the selection rate between white and black applicants.64
checks on job applicants violated Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition); Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749, 750 (6th Cir. 2014) (“In
this case the EEOC sued the defendants for using the same type of background check that
the EEOC itself uses.”); Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 205–09 (2d Cir. 2011)
(discussing firefighter promotion examinations).
57 The percentage of people hired out of the people who applied.
58 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2009).
59 To get this number, divide seventy-two (the pass rate for one group) by eighty (the pass
rate for another group).
60 Same formula: sixty divided by eighty.
61 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009)
(“[A] prima facie case of disparate-impact liability—essentially, a threshold showing of a
significant statistical disparity, and nothing more—is far from a strong basis in evidence” of
liability under Title VII’s disparate impact provisions (citations omitted)).
62 See, e.g., Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 308 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding
that the employer showed that a running exercise was reasonably correlated with job per-
formance because those who passed the run test “had a success rate on the job standards
ranging from 70% to 90%” and the “success rate of the individuals who failed the run test
ranged from 5% to 20%”).
63 Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
64 Cf. Johnson v. City of Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 472 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that the “less
discriminatory alternatives” prong requires the plaintiff to “demonstrate: (1) the availability
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Successful disparate impact lawsuits under Title VII, unlike successful disparate
impact lawsuits under the Fair Housing Act, have led to remedies that raise constitu-
tional difficulties.65 In Inclusive Communities, the Court held that the Fair Housing
Act encompassed a cause of action for disparate impact.66 Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the Court emphasized the history of disparate impact liability under the Fair
Housing Act, observing that remedies ordered in successful lawsuits over the last
four decades have led to race-neutral means to terminate unjustified barriers to fair
housing67 rather than remedies imposing racial quotas.68 Title VII lawsuits in em-
ployment occasionally lead to the same remedy, only requiring the employer to stop
the specific practice creating the disparate impact.69 After Inclusive Communities,
one can predict that such practices are safe from a constitutional attack unless a
court finds a meaningful difference between employment and fair housing. In other
cases, however, successful disparate impact lawsuits in employment have led to
racial quotas,70 which the Court in Inclusive Communities warned would raise serious
constitutional problems.71
3. Racial Remedies in Disparate Impact Cases and the Looming
Constitutional Challenge
Title VII remedial orders that require racial quotas seem ripe for an as-applied
constitutional challenge. Several court orders and consent decrees in recent years have
of alternative procedures that serve the employer’s legitimate interests and (2) produce ‘sub-
stantially equally valid’ results, but with (3) less discriminatory outcomes”).
65 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991) (suggesting that “issues involving
the relevance of legal novelty and unpredictability are best understood as addressing a question
within the law of remedies”).
66 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015).
67 See id. at 2524 (“Governmental or private policies are not contrary to the disparate-
impact requirement unless they are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.’” (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))); Brief for John R. Dunne et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507 [hereinafter
Brief for Dunne et al.] (No. 13-1371) (“But whatever may be its effect in employment,
disparate impact liability in the fair housing context does not encourage racial classifications
or redistribute zero-sum assets from whites to minorities.”).
68 See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (observing that “disparate-impact liability has
always been properly limited in key respects to avoid serious constitutional questions”).
69 See, e.g., NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 486 (3d Cir.
2011) (“The permanent injunction against use of the Residents-Only List is properly circum-
scribed to eliminate the employment practice that the expert reports establish is causing the
disparate impact.”).
70 See infra notes 71–89 and accompanying text.
71 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (“Remedial orders that impose racial targets or
quotas might raise difficult constitutional questions.”).
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imposed just such remedies.72 United States v. City of Austin73 is one recent example.
In 2014, the Department of Justice filed suit against the City of Austin for a disparate
impact resulting from the city’s examination for entry-level firefighters.74 The parties
entered into a consent decree on the same day.75 The complaint did not allege that the
city engaged in intentional discrimination, and the United States conceded that the
city did not do so.76 Although the governmental interest of remedying intentional dis-
crimination was absent in the case,77 the settlement included a batch of remedies such
as quota-based hiring for thirty minority firefighters,78 allotted between “12 African-
American and 18 Hispanic [applicants] from the 2012 hiring process.”79
United States v. New Jersey80 contained similar facts. In 2010, the United States
sued New Jersey and the State’s Civil Services Commission, alleging that the Com-
mission’s selection process for the position of police sergeant produced a disparate
impact on African American and Hispanic applicants, who passed the promotional
examination at lower rates than their white counterparts.81 The parties entered into
a consent decree, which the district court approved over 468 written objections,
including many from those who had already passed the promotional exam, but were
concerned about being skipped over for lower scoring minority applicants.82 Like
the consent decree in United States v. City of Austin, the New Jersey consent decree
included a racial quota as a remedy, dividing sixty-eight priority promotions among
forty-eight African American and twenty Hispanic candidates.83
Court judgments in Title VII disparate impact lawsuits can also mandate racial
quotas. In Lewis v. City of Chicago,84 a group of black firefighter applicants brought
suit on behalf of themselves and every other black firefighter applicant who took
Chicago’s 1995 written firefighter examination.85 The case went to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the unexciting proposition that plaintiffs in Title VII disparate
impact cases may file their claims within 300 days after the employer executes the
allegedly unlawful practice.86 But things got more interesting on remand. The trial
72 See infra notes 73–89 and accompanying text.
73 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Austin, No. 1:14-CV-00533-LY (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 7, 2014).
74 Id. at 2–3.
75 Id. at 7.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Id. at 16.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 No. 10-cv-91, 2012 WL 3265905 (D.N.J. June 12, 2012).
81 Id. at *2 (“From 2000 to 2008, 89% of white candidates passed the written examination,
compared to 73% of African American candidates and 77% of Hispanic candidates.”).
82 Id. at *1.
83 Id. at *5.
84 No. 98-c-5596, 2014 WL 562527 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2014).
85 Id. at *1.
86 See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 210–13 (2010).
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court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on their disparate impact claims, ordering
the City to remedy the Title VII violation by hiring 132 black firefighters and granting
them retroactive seniority.87 But since the plaintiff class consisted of every black
applicant to the 1995 exam, there were around 6,000 people eligible for relief.88 The
court did not order any sort of merit-based test for the applicants, opting instead for
“an imperfect solution” that the “new hires be chosen by lot.”89
As exemplified by all these cases, a constitutional challenge to Title VII’s remedial
orders containing racial quotas is fully feasible.90 That is especially so given the deep
tension between disparate impact liability and the Equal Protection Clause.
B. The “War” Between Disparate Impact and the Equal Protection Clause
Although Title VII was enacted to enforce the promise of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,91 statutory liability for disparate impact has long been divorced from constitu-
tional notions of discrimination. Just five years after the Court interpreted Title VII
to include a disparate impact cause of action in Griggs, it rejected a constitutional
challenge to a written test administered by the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department.92 The employment practice at issue was a police examination
that had a significant adverse impact on black applicants, who failed at a rate around
four times higher than their white counterparts.93 At the time, public employers such
as the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department were not subject to Title VII.94 Thus,
plaintiffs brought their disparate impact claim under the Equal Protection Clause
rather than Title VII.95 The Court rejected the applicants’ claims because they had
not showed that the police department acted with a discriminatory purpose, which
the Court held was a necessary element of an equal protection claim.96
87 Lewis, 2014 WL 562527, at *1.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 To be sure, the Court’s plurality decision in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987), found that a promotional quota of 50% satisfied strict scrutiny. Id. at 149–67. But
subsequent equal protection cases requiring a “demanding” inquiry into race-neutral alterna-
tives make it unclear “if any vestiges of the Paradise approach remain.” John Cocchi Day,
Comment, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a Decade of Federal
Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 108 (2001).
91 In re Emp’t Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1324 (11th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that “in enacting the disparate impact provisions of Title VII, . . . Congress has
acted pursuant to a valid exercise of its [power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause]”).
92 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
93 Selmi, supra note 32, at 725.
94 Id. at 726.
95 Davis, 426 U.S. at 233. Because the defendant was a federal municipality, the claim was
actually under the Fifth Amendment, which the Court had held “reverse incorporated” the Four-
teenth Amendment right to equal protection. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
96 Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (“[B]asic equal protection principle[s] [command] that the
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Although Davis resolved a purely constitutional question, several Justices were
equally anxious about statutory liability for disparate impact. Just the previous year,
Justice Blackmun had expressed his concern that “a too-rigid application of the
EEOC Guidelines [regarding test validation] will leave the employer little choice,
save an impossibly expensive and complex validation study, but to engage in a sub-
jective quota system of employment selection.”97 Then, in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust,98 the Court observed that “the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate
impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophy-
lactic measures.”99
White House officials echoed these concerns.100 A report by Attorney General
Edwin Meese warned that the Supreme Court could “Define Discrimination in
Terms of ‘Disparate Impact’ and Thereby Use the Equal Protection Clause to Require
Race and Gender ‘Affirmative Action’ Policies.”101 Disparate impact liability was
also instantly controversial among academics. A law review article published the
year after Griggs warned that “employers may use privately imposed quotas” to
avoid disparate impact liability.102 In another influential article four decades later,
Richard Primus discussed the “serious conceptual tensions between modern equal
protection doctrine and disparate impact law.”103
The Supreme Court itself recognized these tensions in 2009 with its decision in
Ricci v. DeStefano.104 In 2003, the city of New Haven, Connecticut administered a
written promotional exam to identify candidates for officers in the fire department.105
After receiving information that black applicants failed at significantly higher rates,
the city decided to suspend the process for promoting firefighters and scrapped the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to
a racially discriminatory purpose.”).
97 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
98 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
99 Id. at 992.
100 See Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen., to the Att’y
Gen. on Talking Points for White House Meeting on Voting Rights Act (Jan. 26, 1982),
http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/030-black-binder1
/folder030.pdf [http://perma.cc/E42A-VZTK] (“An effects test for § 2 could . . . lead to a
quota system in electoral politics . . . . Just as we oppose quotas in employment and educa-
tion, so too we oppose them in elections.” (emphasis omitted)).
101 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR
2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 44–56 (1988). For a similar argu-
ment, see David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 124–25
(arguing that affirmative action and disparate impact lie on the same conceptual continuum).
102 Hugh Steven Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations
on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 873
(1972).
103 Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 495.
104 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
105 Id. at 562.
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initial test results in the process.106 A group of white and Hispanic firefighters then
challenged the decision on both statutory and constitutional grounds, alleging that the
city’s decision to discard the scores of the first test was discriminatory under both
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.107
The Supreme Court held that the city’s decision to scrap the initial test results
violated the disparate treatment provision of Title VII because the city lacked a strong
basis in evidence that it would have otherwise been liable under the disparate impact
statute.108 But since the statutory standard of disparate treatment under Title VII is
the same as the constitutional standard for intentional discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause,109 it is safe to say that the Court could have just as easily invali-
dated New Haven’s actions on constitutional grounds.110 Indeed, although the Court’s
statutory holding in Ricci made it unnecessary to resolve the constitutionality of
disparate impact, Justice Scalia warned, in a separate opinion, that “the war between
disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later.”111 He urged the
Court to “begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between”
Title VII’s disparate impact provisions and the Equal Protection Clause.112
The latest battle was fought in Inclusive Communities, which asked “whether
disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.”113 Although the
case dealt with a question of statutory interpretation, amici on both sides seized the
opportunity to discuss the constitutionality of disparate impact liability.114
106 Id.
107 Id. at 562–63.
108 Id. at 585 (“[B]efore an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the
asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer
must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability
if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”).
109 Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1354 (2010)
[hereinafter Primus, Future of Disparate Impact] (noting that equal protection law has “the
same substantive content as Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment”).
110 See id. at 1354–55.
111 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 596.
113 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2513 (2015).
114 See, e.g., Brief for Gail Heriot & Peter Kirsanow as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 29, Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 13-1371) (arguing that disparate impact provisions
of any kind must be subject to strict scrutiny—scrutiny that it likely cannot withstand); Brief for
Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25–26, Inclusive
Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 13-1371) (“To avoid the clear conflict between disparate impact
and the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, this Court should reject an interpretation
of the Fair Housing Act that would permit disparate impact claims.”); Brief for Dunne et al.,
supra note 67, at 3–4 (contending that disparate impact “likely does not even trigger strict
scrutiny under the Constitution. Accordingly, the disparate impact doctrine under the FHA
raises no serious constitutional questions”).
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The Court held that disparate impact claims were cognizable under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA).115 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court observed
that the results-oriented phrase “otherwise make unavailable” in the Fair Housing
Act refers to the consequences of an action rather than the defendant’s intent.116 This
language, the Court added, was similar to language in two other antidiscrimination
statutes that it had previously interpreted to encompass disparate impact liability: the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.117 Thus, like those statutes, the Fair Housing Act encompassed a cause
of action for disparate impact.
As a constitutional matter, the Court noted that remedies imposed in successful
fair housing lawsuits have always been limited in key respects to avoid serious
constitutional questions.118 These remedies comprised of eliminating artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to integration via race-neutral means.119 The Court’s
holding did not fully answer questions about the constitutionality of disparate impact
under Title VII.120 Even proponents of disparate impact in employment have argued
that “the only way to avoid disparate-impact liability is to engage in race-based
remedies, not race-based thinking about what neutral criterion to adopt.”121 Moreover,
disparate impact liability in fair housing, unlike in employment, “does not encourage
racial classifications or redistribute zero-sum assets from whites to minorities.”122
As the Court warned in Inclusive Communities, remedial orders that impose racial
targets or quotas—like those that arise under Title VII—may raise difficult constitu-
tional questions.123
C. The Key Battleground
The crucial question today is whether remedial orders imposing racial quotas can
survive an as-applied challenge. The answer hinges upon the standard of review.124
Strict scrutiny, the most demanding standard of judicial review, requires the govern-
ment to prove that its action both serves a compelling governmental interest125 and
115 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
116 Id. at 2518.
117 Id. at 2518–21.
118 Id. at 2522.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2525.
121 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 13-1371).
122 Brief for Dunne et al., supra note 67, at 7.
123 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
124 Cf. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009) (“Restrictions on speech
based on its content are ‘presumptively invalid’ and subject to strict scrutiny.”); see also
Winkler, supra note 17 (providing an empirical analysis).
125 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22
(2007) (noting that the Court’s prior cases have recognized only two governmental interests
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is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.126 The Supreme Court has considered several
forms of government laws,127 policies,128 and acts129 under strict scrutiny and, in the
equal protection context, has invalidated all of them but one—Grutter v. Bollinger.130
The University of Michigan Law School’s holistic use of race, no longer in place
after Michiganders amended the state constitution,131 survived strict scrutiny in
Grutter, and that decision was hardly uncontroversial. Multiple Justices have criti-
cized the Grutter majority for improperly applying strict scrutiny,132 and others are
eager to overrule the case.133
By contrast, rational basis review gives the government much more leeway.
Laws subject to that standard are “accorded a strong presumption of validity,”134 and
the party challenging the law must negate every conceivable basis which might sup-
port it.135 Judicial deference to laws is so great that some have questioned whether
the standard provides meaningful review at all.136
Inclusive Communities is the latest case exacerbating the tension between rational
basis review and strict scrutiny for disparate impact remedial orders containing racial
quotas. Strict scrutiny is triggered in two situations: when a law contains an express
racial classification (i.e., mentions race)137 and when government action is taken
as compelling: remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and encouraging di-
versity in higher education).
126 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420–21 (2013) (describing the
Court’s jurisprudence on narrow tailoring).
127 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (invalidating the Virginia statute
prohibiting interracial marriages involving white persons).
128 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 254–57 (2003) (invalidating the University
of Michigan’s admissions policy of awarding every applicant from an under-represented
racial or ethnic minority group twenty points).
129 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (invalidating a California
municipality’s selective enforcement of a laundry ordinance).
130 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The internment policy in the infamous case of Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), also survived strict scrutiny, but that case was analyzed
under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 215–19.
131 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1628–31 (2014).
132 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Although the Court
recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is un-
precedented in its deference.”); id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for failing to apply strict scrutiny correctly).
133 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
134 Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
135 Id. at 320.
136 Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 898, 898 (2005) (arguing that the “rational basis test is nothing more than a
Magic Eight Ball that randomly generates different answers to key constitutional questions
depending on who happens to be shaking it and with what level of vigor”).
137 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227–31 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to a facially classificatory program).
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because of race.138 Nonetheless, various applications of the standard in the past twenty
years have caused significant confusion.139 The census contains express racial classi-
fications, but does not trigger strict scrutiny.140 Police officers make decisions based
on race when they use race in suspect descriptions, but courts do not apply strict scru-
tiny to the typical instance of that act.141 Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion142 in
Parents Involved predicted that the usual instance of school zoning would not be
subjected to strict scrutiny, even if the school board drew school lines with racial
demographics in mind.143 And in Inclusive Communities, the Court extrapolated that
rule to fair housing.144
Before Inclusive Communities, academics addressing the conflict between disparate
impact liability under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause had reached one of
three categorical conclusions: (1) disparate impact liability always triggers strict scru-
tiny;145 (2) disparate impact liability never triggers strict scrutiny besides in limited
situations such as Ricci;146 or (3) some readings of Ricci will subject every form of
disparate impact liability to strict scrutiny, while others will allow virtually all applica-
tions of disparate impact liability to be reviewed under a deferential standard.147 After
the Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, it is likely that none of these unyield-
ing statements regarding disparate impact liability is correct. Rather, the Court will
likely conduct a nuanced approach and distinguish between remedial orders imposing
racial quotas and ones that do not.148 Because Inclusive Communities implied that
138 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502–03 (2005) (invalidating the un-
written prison policy of segregating new prisoners for up to sixty days).
139 See infra Part II.
140 See, e.g., Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 814–15 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
141 See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 816 (2001).
142 See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Comment, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases:
There Is No Other Way, 121 HARV. L. REV. 158, 170 (2007) (“As the narrowest rationale in
support of the prevailing judgment, the Kennedy opinion becomes the controlling one and
the subject of close scrutiny for educators and lawyers alike.” (footnote omitted)).
143 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
144 See 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (“[D]isparate-impact liability has always been
properly limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might
arise under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing
of a statistical disparity.”).
145 Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 2008–
2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 83 (2009).
146 Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 502–15; Siegel, From
Colorblindness, supra note 23, at 1315–48.
147 Primus, Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 109.
148 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (“Without adequate safeguards . . . , disparate-
impact liability might cause race to be used and considered in a pervasive way and ‘would
almost inexorably lead’ governmental or private entities to use ‘numerical quotas,’ and serious
constitutional questions then could arise.” (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 653 (1989))).
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remedial orders mandating only an injunction to halt the offending practice would
only be subject to rational basis review in fair housing cases, there is a good possi-
bility that the same remedy in employment disparate impact cases would be subject
to the same type of review. But remedies imposing racial quotas implicate equal pro-
tection concerns to a much greater degree149 and likely trigger strict scrutiny even
after the Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities.
The consequences of applying strict scrutiny in equal protection cases are sig-
nificant. There are only two governmental interests that the Court has recognized as
compelling: remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and an interest
in diversity in higher education.150 The compelling interest of remedying intentional
discrimination cannot justify a disparate impact remedial order containing racial
quotas. The Court has consistently required a particularized showing of the prior
discrimination by the governmental unit involved rather than an amorphous claim
of societal discrimination.151 In theory, courts could read Title VII’s disparate impact
provisions in a way that limits it as an evidentiary dragnet to smoke out instances
of intentional discrimination.152 In practice, they do not do so.153 Rather, Title VII’s
disparate impact provisions are often used to remedy “structural discrimination,”
and impose liability on “employer[s] acting without bias.”154 Title VII’s procedural
mechanics confirm this point. The plaintiff in a disparate impact lawsuit is not
required to plead intentional discrimination,155 and the absence of a good-faith de-
fense casts serious doubt on viewing disparate impact liability solely as an eviden-
tiary dragnet for intentional discrimination.156
Nor could an interest in diversity justify disparate impact liability under Title VII.
As the Court explained in Parents Involved, a compelling interest in diversity was
tolerable in the unique context of higher education given “the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university environment,” and the fact that
“universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”157 That setting
149 See infra Part III.
150 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22
(2007).
151 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
152 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
153 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation
in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 15) (noting other readings of Title VII’s disparate impact provisions
such as “aiming to overcome an unfair group-based distribution of jobs” and “protecting
individuals against arbitrary barriers to opportunity”) (on file with author).
154 Siegel, Race-Conscious, supra note 45, at 658.
155 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577 (noting that disparate impact claims involve “practices that are
not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities”).
156 Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 724 (2007)
(quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
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is altogether different from employment.158 Thus, as the Deputy Solicitor General
conceded in Ricci, the government’s interest in a diverse workplace cannot be ad-
vanced by racial classifications.159
Professor Eang Ngov has identified one more interest as compelling, arguing
that disparate impact liability serves the interest in “removing barriers and providing
equal employment opportunities.”160 That is a laudable goal, of course, as there are
many unnecessary barriers to economic opportunity in the country today.161 But courts
generally review those barriers under rational basis review162 and permit most of them
to remain in effect.163 Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that government
programs designed to eliminate barriers cannot serve as a compelling governmental
interest if they eliminate barriers for only certain racial groups.164 In Grutter, the
Court hinted that the University of Michigan Law School could have de-emphasized
the role of standardized test scores in admissions decisions for all students,165 but no
one argued that the University had a compelling interest in doing so for only under-
represented minorities.166 Professor Ngov’s proposed interest in removing barriers
to equal employment opportunities thus cannot serve as a compelling interest for im-
posing a racial quota in a Title VII disparate impact remedial order.
That racial quotas in disparate impact remedial orders cannot survive strict scru-
tiny makes the issue left open after Inclusive Communities all the more crucial: What
is the proper standard of review for such orders? Court cases on the census, suspect
descriptions, and school zoning—as well as Inclusive Communities itself—make this
a hard question.
158 See Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Em-
ployment After Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1130–57
(2006) (discussing reasons not to expand the diversity interest to employment).
159 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Ricci, 557 U.S. 557 (No. 07-1428) (“[Court]: . . .
Does the government consider promotion of diversity by itself a compelling state interest in
the employment context as opposed to the school context? [Deputy Solicitor General]: We
think . . . it probably is a compelling state interest, but it is not one that . . . can be advanced . . .
by racial classifications.”).
160 Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision and the
Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 81 (2010).
161 See Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test,
99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1084–89 (2013) (summarizing the proliferation of occupational licens-
ing laws).
162 See Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent
Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1023–24 (2006).
163 Id. at 1024.
164 See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
165 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241) (Court: “Now, if Michigan really cares enough about that racial imbalance, why doesn’t
it do as many other State law schools do, lower the standards”).
166 Brief for Respondents at 14–17, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (arguing that the
university’s program was justified solely by an interest in diversity).
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II. BLURRING THE LINES: NOT ALL RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
TRIGGER STRICT SCRUTINY
The Court has never produced a precise definition of what counts as a classifica-
tion, and court decisions approving of the use of race in census questionnaires, suspect
descriptions, and zoning decisions create confusion as to exactly what type of law or
policy is subject to strict scrutiny.167 Academics use these examples to say that courts
must make judgments about “normative reasonableness” of racial quotas in disparate
impact remedial orders before deciding whether to subject them to strict scrutiny.168
A. The Census
Remedial orders involving racial quotas lists racial groups,169 and thus a straight-
forward application of strict scrutiny seems appropriate.170 But although the Su-
preme Court has often repeated the maxim that all racial classifications trigger strict
scrutiny,171 a case applying rational basis review in an equal protection challenge to
the census leads observers to believe that this maxim is incorrect.172
The Constitution directs Congress to conduct a census every ten years,173 and
every census since the Founding has included a question about race.174 In Morales
v. Daley, a group of five plaintiffs complained that two questionnaires from the 2000
census violated the Equal Protection Clause because they required individuals to
self-identify by race.175 Applying rational basis review, the court affirmed the consti-
tutionality of the census.176 It reasoned that there is a “distinction between collecting
demographic data so that the government may have the information it believes . . .
it needs in order to govern, and governmental use of suspect classifications without
a compelling interest.”177
167 Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63–67 (2013) (using
police practices as an example).
168 See Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 512.
169 See, e.g., Consent Decree at 16–17, United States v. City of Austin, No. 1:14-CV-00533-
LY (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2014).
170 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classi-
fications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
171 Id.
172 See Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 505, 510.
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
174 Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
175 Id. at 803–04.
176 Id. at 814–15.
177 Id. at 814; cf. Brief for Dunne et al., supra note 67, at 11–12 (arguing that the race-
tracking provision of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, like the disparate impact require-
ment of the Fair Housing Act, reflects a “commitment to reverse the legacy of public and
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As an obvious racial classification subject to mere rational basis review, the
census appears to have leveled a significant blow to strict adherents of an anticlassi-
fication principle.178 According to some, Morales stands for the proposition that only
classifications with particular effects are objectionable.179 The rationale could be
extended to apply deferential review for racial quotas in remedial orders.
B. Police Practices
Government decisions made on the basis of race are also considered classifica-
tions and generally subject to strict scrutiny. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, for example, the
Court famously struck down an ordinance that was selectively enforced by a city to
close down laundries owned by Chinese persons.180 More recently, in Johnson v.
California, the Court invalidated an unwritten policy of segregating new prisoners
for up to sixty days.181 Disparate impact remedial orders that call for racial quotas
also fall within this category. Whereas the government in Yick Wo used race as the
determinative factor in deciding who should be burdened by its action, quota-based
remedial orders use race to determine who should benefit.
But this rule also has its exceptions. Descriptions of suspects in police reports
frequently contain the suspect’s race.182 Yet, courts have generally reviewed suspect
descriptions containing race in police investigations under a deferential standard—at
least in instances where race is used in conjunction with other identifiers.183
In Brown v. City of Oneonta, the Second Circuit held that the police may use
race in determining who it should detain in response to a reported crime.184 The case
involved an equal protection challenge brought by several black males who were
questioned in response to a midnight assault.185 The court concluded that “[i]n acting
on the description provided by the victim of the assault—a description that included
race as one of several elements—[the police] did not engage in a suspect racial
classification that would draw strict scrutiny.”186 Courts thus give the police leeway
private discrimination” and “do[es] not trigger strict scrutiny merely because [it] forthrightly
address[es] racial issues”).
178 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassi-
fication or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 17–20 (2003).
179 See, e.g., Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2007).
180 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).
181 543 U.S. 499, 502, 515 (2005).
182 See, e.g., How to Describe a Suspect, CHI. POLICE, http://home.chicagopolice.org/get
-involved-with-caps/hotlines-and-cpd-contacts/how-to-describe-a-suspect/ [http://perma.cc
/W7K4-AMDH] (listing “[r]ace or national origin” as one of “[a] variety of general description
information about the suspect [that] should be noted”).
183 See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 776 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (collecting cases),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001).
184 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
816 (2001).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 337–38.
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when they are looking for a specific perpetrator in response to a specific crime, such
as describing the suspects in a bank robbery as “three slim black men between 20
and 25 years old,” wearing dark clothing and between 5’5 and 5’8.187 Courts do not
defer to the police, however, in cases of racial profiling, such as random police sweeps
targeted racial groups and aimed at preventing future crimes.188 For instance, con-
ducting highway searches on the basis of race because different races were sus-
pected of carrying different drugs will likely trigger strict scrutiny.189
C. Zoning Decisions
Two similar examples come from Justice Kennedy, the Justice casting the de-
ciding vote in the Court’s most recent equal protection cases. In Parents Involved,
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion presumed that race-conscious school zoning
decisions would not be subject to strict scrutiny.190 In Inclusive Communities eight
years later, Justice Kennedy used Parents Involved to refute the notion that disparate
impact liability in fair housing raised significant constitutional problems.191 He
explained that just as school boards “may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through [race-neutral] means,” housing
authorities may combat racial isolation with race-neutral tools, and “mere awareness
of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that
endeavor at the outset.”192 At the same time, the Court affirmed outer limits on the
means used to further racial integration. In Parents Involved, the Court invalidated
an attempt to integrate schools with the use of racial classifications.193 In Inclusive
187 See United States v. Carpenter, 342 F.3d 812, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2003).
188 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827 (D. Ariz. 2013). Commentators also distinguish
between the use of race in suspect descriptions and racial profiling. See, e.g., DAVID COLE,
NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 50 (1999)
(“Although racial identity, like hair color or attire, is an appropriate consideration in iden-
tifying suspects where an eyewitness has described a specific perpetrator of a particular
crime, profiles serve a different function altogether.”); Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy,
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1999, at 34 (arguing that “[o]ur commitment to a just social order
should prompt us to end racial profiling even if the generalizations on which the technique
is based are buttressed by empirical evidence,” but using race in suspect descriptions is
acceptable because race, there, serves as “a trait linked to a particular person with respect to
a particular incident. It is not a free-floating [accusation]”); see also Albert W. Alschuler,
Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 196–200 (2002).
189 See Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 721 (2002).
190 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
191 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015).
192 Id.
193 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747–48.
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Communities, the Court hinted that it would strike down integrative housing pro-
grams that called for racial quotas.194
III. EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLES: WHY THE EXCEPTIONS ARE NOT THE RULE
Should remedial orders mandating racial quotas trigger strict scrutiny? There are
four principles that may shed light on the inquiry: burden allocation, expressive
harm, universalism, and context. Many of these principles are interrelated, so readers
may disagree about the precise categorization of a court’s statement in one section
or another. For instance, laws that directly allocate burdens on the basis of race are
more likely to generate hostility and impose visible harms. That the Court’s state-
ments are sometimes not susceptible to precise categorization is desirable and in
accord with the general functions of constitutional law.195
There is already plenty of commentary that specifies how these principles are
gathered from the Court’s opinions, and what they say about the viability of a facial
challenge to Title VII’s disparate impact provisions.196 But Inclusive Communities
calls for a more nuanced approach, and the principles also explain why disparate
impact remedial orders containing racial quotas call for a more stringent form of
judicial scrutiny than those that do not.
A. Burden Allocation
1. Allocative Motive
In determining the proper standard of review, courts often look to whether the
legislature intended to distribute benefits and burdens on a racial basis.197 The require-
ment of an allocative motive serves as both a causation requirement and a limiting
principle. It aligns the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence with its oft-repeated
presumption that most legislation is constitutional,198 and it will not be reviewed
194 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
195 See R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially
Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 353, 395 (2004) (observing that standards in one area of constitutional law are often
applied to another).
196 Richard Primus has discussed disparate impact with respect to expressive harm. See
Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 566–85. Reva Siegel has dis-
cussed disparate impact with universalism. See Siegel, From Colorblindness, supra note 23,
at 1332–49. This Article builds on their analyses, focuses on remedies, and reaches a dif-
ferent result.
197 See, e.g., Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 814 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (“Plaintiffs’
position is based upon a misunderstanding of the distinction between collecting demographic
data so that the government may have the information it believes . . . it needs in order to
govern, and governmental use of suspect classifications without a compelling interest.”).
198 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (justifying a presumption
of constitutionality for duly enacted statutes based on Congress’s right and duty to “make its
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under a theory that some have called “fatal in fact.”199 And just as the causation re-
quirement limits liability in contracts,200 and torts,201 it also limits the instances in
which government decisions are subject to strict scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Parents Involved202 and Inclusive Communities203 are
standard examples of the allocative motive requirement. The usual instance of school
zoning will take multiple factors into account.204 School boards often consider race-
neutral criteria such as income distributions and traffic patterns anytime they need to
draw new school lines, but the resulting boundaries may have a coincidental dispa-
rate impact on racial enrollment patterns.205 The same reasoning leads to deferential
review for zoning officials in housing, who “must often make decisions based on a
mix of [race-neutral] factors, both objective (such as cost and traffic patterns) and,
at least to some extent, subjective (such as preserving historic architecture).”206
Another example is the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan,207 often discussed by com-
mentators as a reason not to apply strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge to
Title VII’s disparate impact provisions.208 That law allows students graduating in the
own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution”); cf. Michael J.
Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 752 (2008) (“Indeed, the number
of laws struck down by the Court is small. It has overturned fewer than 200 federal laws,
which averages less than one per year since the Court’s inception.” (footnote omitted)).
199 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972).
200 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 563,
612 (1992) (discussing the principle that consequential damages for breach of contract can
be recovered only if foreseeable is derived from the emphasis on “certainty, liability-limiting
devices, and standardized rules”).
201 Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1774 (1985)
(observing that the causation requirement “plays an extremely significant role in both es-
tablishing and limiting legal responsibility”).
202 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
203 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015).
204 See Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 09-2095, 2010 WL 2595278, at
*11–15 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2010) (finding that the redistricting plan at issue was motivated
by several non-racial reasons such as equalizing enrollment among the schools, minimizing
travel time and costs, and maximizing the number of children who would be allowed to stay
at their current school); see also Meredith Page Richards & Kori James Stroub, School
Catchment Zones, Politically Defined School Boundaries, in SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION: AN
A-TO-Z GUIDE 670, 671 (James Ainsworth ed., 2013) (detailing the use of the same race-
neutral factors when drawing school lines).
205 See Richards & Stroub, supra note 204, at 670–71.
206 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
207 See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2015).
208 See Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 541–42 (“The intent
of the Ten Percent Plan . . . is to increase minority enrollment. Nonetheless, many opponents
of classificatory affirmative action have endorsed the Ten Percent Plan.” (footnote omitted)).
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top 10% of their high school class automatic admission into any public school in
Texas.209 Most students choose the University of Texas, the top public university in
the state.210 The legislature enacted the program in response to plummeting numbers of
minority enrollees at the University of Texas after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Hopwood v. Texas211 did away with traditional affirmative action in the State. Several
Justices have cited the plan with approval,212 despite the contention that the program
was created with an impermissible racial motivation.213
The Court’s observations on the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan have much to do
with its inability to make confident pronouncements about legislative motive given
the dearth of an evidentiary record.214 In light of the variety of factors that go into
admissions programs, the Court is reluctant to tarnish the plan with the brush of dis-
crimination before the Court can rule out race-neutral explanations such as increas-
ing geographic or socioeconomic diversity.215
The Court’s approval of the plan is also influenced by the doctrine-shaping role
of appellate courts.216 Although there was ample evidence that the Texas plan was
motivated by racial considerations,217 no one knows how a decision invalidating the
law would affect similar programs around the country,218 or indeed any decision by
209 The program originally guaranteed admissions to those finishing in the top 10% of
their high school class. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West). The legislature amended
the law, but not the name, allowing the University of Texas at Austin to limit its enrollment
under the plan to 75% of total capacity. 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 1342 (West). In
practice, however, UT–Austin only admits students in the top 7% of each high school class.
See Matthew Watkins, UT–Austin Automatic Admissions Standard for 2017: Top 7 Percent,
TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.texastribune.org/2015/09/29/new-ut-austin-auto
matic-admissions-standard-2017-t/ [http://perma.cc/4KST-QAMA].
210 See Top Public Schools: National Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://
colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/top
-public [http://perma.cc/FC8B-BYWE] (last updated Sept. 11, 2015).
211 78 F.3d 932, 934–35 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
343 (2003) (endorsing the limited use of race in law school admissions).
212 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2432 (2013) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (opining that “most blacks and Hispanics attending the University [of Texas] were admitted
without discrimination” under the Top Ten Percent Plan).
213 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the
Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 323–27 (2001) (describing the origins and
legislative history of the plan).
214 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
215 Cf. Daniel Kiel, Accepting Justice Kennedy’s Dare: The Future of Integration in a
Post-PICS World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2884 (2010) (arguing that student assignment
plans that focus on non-racial factors such as socioeconomic status or geography would not
trigger strict scrutiny).
216 See generally Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2045 (2008).
217 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 213, at 321–30.
218 See Michelle Adams, Isn’t It Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage
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admissions officers to de-emphasize traditional admissions criteria for other indica-
tors of performance.219
These concerns, which have led to dictum supporting the Top Ten Percent Plan,
are mostly absent with remedial orders that mandate racial quotas. An employer with
a workforce that is racially balanced could be motivated by a number of concerns.
An employment practice that results in a diverse workforce raises no significant
problems because it will usually be impossible to trace the employer’s motive in
such circumstances as complying with Title VII’s disparate impact provisions. Ricci
was an outlier in this context because the city admitted that it scrapped the initial test
due to the racial composition of successful candidates.220 But courts are otherwise
hesitant to select “complying with Title VII’s disparate impact provisions” as the
motivating factor absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.221
The analysis changes altogether when a remedial order calls for a racial quota.
When this is the case, the explicit requirement of the racial redistribution of a number
of jobs is in the open. An apt comparison here is the difference between the use of race
in suspect descriptions, which is reviewed under a deferential standard,222 and racial
profiling, which is subject to strict scrutiny.223 Race is only one of many factors in de-
cisions regarding employment224 and housing.225 Likewise, the police consider a multi-
tude of factors when they use a suspect’s description to narrow the list of people
they will question, and a court might have a hard time guessing the degree to which
race played a role. By contrast, race is the only factor in racial profiling and quota-based
remedial orders, so neither leaves any doubt that race was the motivating factor.
2. Allocative Effect
Much of the analysis dealing with the requirement of an allocative motive overlaps
with the requirement of an allocative effect. Courts do not use racial effects as a cate-
gorical trigger for strict scrutiny, because everything has a racial effect at some point.226
Plans,” 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1740–46 (2001) (describing percentage plans in California
and Florida).
219 See generally Valerie Strauss, Revolt Against High-Stakes Standardized Testing Grow-
ing—and So Does Its Impact, WASH. POST: ANSWER SHEET (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2015/03/19/revolt-against-high-stakes
-standardized-testing-growing-and-so-does-its-impact/ [http://perma.cc/3FAK-WNWE].
220 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 572–74 (2009).
221 Primus, Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 109, at 1379.
222 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
816 (2001).
223 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 570–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
224 See Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 308 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing
twelve job standards for Pennsylvania police officers).
225 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2523 (2015).
226 Cf. Disparate Impact and the Rule of Law: Does Disparate Impact Liability Make
Everything Illegal?, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.fed-soc.org/multimedia
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Rather, courts have distinguished between direct racially allocative effects, which
trigger strict scrutiny, and indirect effects, which do not. A racial quota in a dispa-
rate impact remedial order is the prime example of a direct racially allocative effect:
the court orders the redistribution of a number of jobs to members of a certain race
and it is done. But, with the census, the Top Ten Percent Plan, and disparate impact
liability in fair housing, courts will not apply strict scrutiny because the racially allo-
cative effect is too indirect, and recognizing a constitutional claim in such cases would
subject every law to invalidation.
So it is true that laws like the Ten Percent Plan cause a racial effect, but the effect
is less direct—and therefore less deserving of strict judicial scrutiny—than disparate im-
pact remedial orders that involve racial employment quotas. For instance, 75% of the
seats at the University of Texas are filled by those who are enrolled under the Top Ten
Percent Plan.227 Unsuccessful white applicants may argue that the plan reduced the
number of seats available to those considered under holistic review. But if the Univer-
sity of Texas did away with its current use of racial classifications at the holistic review
stage, then unsuccessful applicants would have a hard time proving that they were dis-
advantaged on the basis of illegitimate preferences at either the Top Ten Percent Plan
stage or the holistic review stage of the application process. The same principle applies
with census questionnaires and disparate impact liability in fair housing. Like racial
quotas in remedial orders, both data gathered from the census and fair housing decisions
may have a racial effect at some point.228 But the effect is much more indirect.
B. Expressive Harm
The Equal Protection Clause is concerned with more than just racial allocation.229
Expressive harm is a potential characteristic of the government’s message: both the
message conveyed and the message felt.230 The doctrine recognizes that there is more
/detail/disparate-impact-and-the-rule-of-law-does-disparate-impact-liability-make
-everything-illegal-event-audiovideo.
227 See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (West 2015).
228 Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in
Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 454 (2004) (“Race-based statistics undoubtedly
provide the basis for race-based decisions—and the use of such information may be unpre-
dictable.”); see also Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-
Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
73, 95–97 (1994) (offering racial statistics as the basis for calculating tort damages).
229 Cf. Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective
Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1096 (2002) (“It is not always true, however, that a
white applicant who would have been admitted had she been able to benefit from a racial
preference also would have been admitted had the admissions process employed no racial
preferences at all. In fact, the vast majority of such applicants would have been rejected even
under a race-neutral process.”).
230 See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). Richard Primus calls the message
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to any act than the ultimate result.231 Consider the custom of gift-giving. Many Ameri-
cans exchange gifts for special occasions.232 But giving money may be the better
option for those concerned solely with utility. That’s because many gifts end up in
the hands of someone who has no use for them, or someone who may well have
preferred buying a different item with the money used to buy the gift.233 Economists
call this inefficient outcome “deadweight loss,” and the amount of it that results
from gift-giving leaves them rubbing their eyes.234
But there’s more to gifts than their utility.235 There is also an expressive benefit:
you took the time to find out what someone wanted. Handing someone a twenty-dollar
bill instead of a gift card of the same value to that person’s favorite restaurant might
show that you didn’t care enough to find out where the person likes to eat.236 That’s
an expressive harm.
The Court has long been concerned with the expressive harm of race-based deci-
sion-making. From Strauder v. West Virginia237 to Brown v. Board of Education,238
the Court has been cognizant of the social meaning of government action.239 Strange as
it seems, the constitutional analysis can sometimes change according to how a law is
viewed. The shift in the Court’s views on laws requiring disclosure of racial information
provides one example. In 1964, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a law that required
political candidates to list their race on the ballot.240 Decades later, a federal court re-
jected a challenge to the census, and analyzed the challenge under rational basis re-
view.241 The doctrine of expressive harm casts light on this shift. The civil rights
community had previously distrusted government efforts to collect data, viewing it as
a practice likely to entrench segregation.242 It saw Louisiana’s use of racial identifiers
felt the “consequentialist approach” and the message conveyed to a reasonable observer “the re-
velatory approach.” See Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 566–84.
231 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 230, at 1508–14 (summarizing expressive theories
of individual conduct).
232 See Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous
Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 571 (1997) (discussing formal gifts such as holiday cards
and birthday gifts).
233 See Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1328,
1336 (1993) (noting that up to a third of the $38 billion spent on holiday gifts in 1992 was
deadweight loss).
234 Id.
235 See Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Comment, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas,
86 AM. ECON. REV. 1299, 1304 (1996) (contending that gifts are valued for reasons other than
their price).
236 See id.
237 100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
238 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
239 See Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 566–85.
240 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
241 Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 809–12 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
242 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 937 (2006).
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on the ballot as a prelude to discrimination. But its views on data collection changed
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,243 after which data collection measures were viewed
as legitimate tools to smoke out violations of the Act.244
Two overarching themes the Court has adopted with respect to impermissible
government expressions are related: treating people as members of racial groups
instead of individuals245 and the stigmatic harm imposed by racial preferences.246
The Court frowns upon government treatment of its citizens as members of racial
groups rather than individuals. Group-based treatment is “odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,”247 and “reinforces the per-
ception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike.”248 Another expressive
harm deals with the stigma that preferences impose on those who benefit from such
programs. Justice Brennan wrote four decades ago that such preferences “perpetuate[]
disadvantageous treatment of [its] supposed beneficiaries.”249 Justice Thomas added
more recently: “[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended con-
sequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.”250
Not every race-conscious action reveals an impermissible viewpoint. Both suspect
descriptions and racial profiling involve a government actor making race-conscious
decisions. But the reason why courts have treated the two differently is the degree
to which they reveal group treatment.251 Racial profiles are undeniably focused on
groups, whereas suspect descriptions allow for decisions that place less emphasis on
race.252 The City of Oneonta court explained this point. To start, the suspect descrip-
tion originated with a private party and there was no evidence in the record suggesting
that the police intended to target a minority group.253 And because the police were
243 Id. at 938.
244 Id. at 938–39.
245 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (reaffirming
the notion that “the Constitution protects persons, not groups”).
246 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (noting that
“[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm” and “may in fact promote
notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility”).
247 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 214 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
248 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
249 United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
250 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).
251 R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection
Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1107 (2001) (“[P]rofiles foreground the
group, while suspect descriptions focus on the individual. A profile suggests a type of person,
a description a [sic] specific person. Profiles’ emphasis on groups invokes the sorts of harms
the Equal Protection Clause is thought to guard against, and suspect descriptions’ focus on
the individual seems to comport perfectly with notions of liberal individualism.”).
252 Id.
253 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In this case, plaintiffs do
not sufficiently allege discriminatory intent.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001).
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seeking an offender whose race was already known, the practice did not brand other
members of the race as crime prone.254 By contrast, racial profiling ratifies an imper-
missible government viewpoint that some groups are more susceptible to crime.255
As one court put it, such policies send the message that those detained are “criminals
first and individuals second.”256
That is all the more reason why racial quotas in remedial orders raise significantly
more problems than enjoining truly arbitrary decision-making with an incidental
disparate impact. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Inclusive Communities reflects the
viewpoint that race-neutral remedies, like the use of race in suspect descriptions,
leave ample room for individualized treatment. Remedies imposed in disparate
impact lawsuits have traditionally forced zoning officials to focus on factors that did
not inject race into the process.257 In Inclusive Communities, the Court indicated that
asking the defendant in a disparate impact lawsuit to focus on race-neutral measures
that serve the defendants objectives just as well does not express an impermissible
government viewpoint.258 But that analysis says little about the viewpoint the gov-
ernment expresses when it redistributes opportunities on the basis of race alone.
Yet, another problem with quota-based remedies is that there are generally more
claimants than beneficiaries. For example, in Lewis v. City of Chicago, there were
around 6,000 claimants for only 132 spots.259 As a consequence, the beneficiaries
were selected by lot, and the pool of claimants included every black applicant.260 In
Gratz v. Bollinger,261 the Court struck down an admissions program that gave all
under-represented minorities an additional twenty points out of the one hundred
points needed to guarantee admission into the school.262 As the Court explained,
allowing all members of certain races an additional benefit based on their race is
unconstitutional, even if it is not a guarantor of success for all applicants. The reme-
dial order in Lewis is more group-focused, and therefore more subjugating, than the
affirmative action program in Gratz. In Gratz, the race-based bonus was just one
part of the scoring process, and was used in conjunction with merit-based factors
254 Alschuler, supra note 188, at 265.
255 Id.; cf., e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (“Even if
a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-
based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of
gender in jury selection. We have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifica-
tions that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when
some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.”).
256 United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000).
257 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2523 (2015).
258 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
259 No. 98-c-5596, 2014 WL 562527, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2014).
260 Id.
261 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
262 Id. at 256.
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such as high school grades, standardized test scores, athletic achievement and musi-
cal prowess.263 In Lewis, race was the only factor.264
C. Universalism
The principle of universalism favors laws that seek to benefit everyone regardless
of race. This concept originated with Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis,265
which posited that the law cannot create theories of discrimination without broad
societal support.266 Although the Court is a countermajoritarian institution in theory,267
its norms are unquestionably shaped by those of society.268 Universalism weighs the
degree to which a law emphasizes commonality against the degree to which it incites
hostility. The principle has many benefits.269 As a tactical matter, laws emphasizing
common benefits secure political support and ensure broad judicial implementation.270
As a substantive matter, they address discrimination in a more effective way by
focusing on broader problems of injustice.271 As an expressive matter, they undermine
divisive stereotypes and send a message of community unity.272 Perhaps for those
reasons, universalism has been favored by the Justices who have cast the deciding
votes in equal protection cases over the past forty years.273
Both Justice Powell in Bakke and Justice O’Connor in Grutter embraced fos-
tering diversity in higher education as a compelling interest for affirmative action
263 Id. at 255.
264 Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 209 (2010).
265 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (positing that official policies supporting mi-
norities emerge when the interests of those in power converge with the interests of those who
are marginalized).
266 Selmi, supra note 32, at 781–82 (“Perhaps the ultimate mistake of the disparate impact
theory was a belief that our society and courts were better than they are, and that the law
alone could create a theory of discrimination and equality without broader social support.”).
267 See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998).
268 See Kevin Russell, Ask the Author with Barry Friedman, Part I, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25,
2010, 5:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/ask-the-author-with-barry-friedman-part-i/
[http://perma.cc/G4Q8-GHDQ] (“[Russell:] What would you say that the basic thesis of your
book is? [Friedman:] That the Supreme Court is, and always has been, accountable to the
popular will.”).
269 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Essay, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on
Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014) (surveying political and other benefits).
270 Id. at 2847–51.
271 Id. at 2856–59.
272 Id. at 2863–64.
273 See Heather K. Gerken, Comment, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protec-
tion, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104 (2007) (“Like his swing-vote predecessors Justices Powell
and O’Connor, Kennedy is feeling the pressure associated with being the middle Justice on
a divided Court.”).
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programs.274 Indeed, the interest in diversity has gradually replaced an interest in
remedying past discrimination as the primary justification for such programs.275 The
problem with the diversity justification, however, is that hardly anyone on either side
believes that it is real. Those who support affirmative action are “increasingly dis-
mayed [by] the costs to intellectual honesty of the felt need to shoehorn one’s argu-
ments into the language of ‘diversity.’”276 Those who oppose affirmative action call
it “little more than an invitation for fraud by nearly all colleges and universities.”277
But the appeal of the diversity interest for Justices Powell and O’Connor, per-
haps, is that it reduces the role of blame in fostering a remedy, thereby increasing
social support.278 Justice Kennedy echoed this point in Parents Involved and Inclu-
sive Communities. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to empha-
size the universal benefits of facially neutral school zoning decisions, which he
believed would not warrant strict scrutiny.279 Justice Kennedy remarked that school
authorities should be allowed to devise ways to offer “an equal educational opportu-
nity to all of their students” without “caus[ing] a new divisiveness” and “corrosive
discourse.”280 Justice Kennedy repeated these principles in Inclusive Communities,
where he stated that using disparate impact liability solely as a mechanism to enjoin
arbitrary housing practces can help with “our Nation’s continuing struggle against
racial isolation.”281
274 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“Today, we hold that the Law School
has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (“[T]he attainment of a diverse student body . . . is
a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”).
275 RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE
LAW 199–205 (2013).
276 SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 56 (2003); see also Jed Rubenfeld,
Essay, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 471 (1997) (“Everyone knows that in most
cases a true diversity of perspectives and backgrounds is not really being pursued.”).
277 Lino A. Graglia, Affirmative Action: Today and Tomorrow, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1353,
1359 (1996); see PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 1 (2003) (arguing
that “it is time to retire diversity from the small company of concepts that guide our thinking
about who we are as a people and how we might best reconcile our differences”); Joshua P.
Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An Opportunity
for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 437,
485 (2011) (“To put it bluntly, the diversity policy endorsed by Grutter is unconstitutional.
It adopts the counter-constitutional principle of promoting group rights over individual
rights.”); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“‘[D]iversity,’ for
all of its devotees, is more a fashionable catchphrase than it is a useful term, especially when
something as serious as racial discrimination is at issue.” (alteration in original)).
278 See Bagenstos, supra note 269, at 2847–51.
279 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
280 Id. at 788, 797.
281 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015).
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1. Universal Benefits
A court examines the universal benefit of a law by looking at the degree to
which it emphasizes commonality. Here, the Supreme Court is telling lawyers to
frame arguments in terms of benefiting everyone,282 thereby reducing the anxieties
inherent in a pluralistic society.283 It is therefore hardly surprising that briefs sup-
porting affirmative action programs after Grutter emphasized the common benefits
that affirmative action programs supposedly flow to people of all races.284 There is
no reason to expect that the universal benefits of a diverse workforce, if any,285
would be different depending on whether the employer achieved its goals through
a disparate impact remedial order or by other means. The difference comes in terms
of pluralistic costs.
2. Pluralistic Costs
Laws that incite hostility are more susceptible to invalidation.286 The census, the
Top Ten Percent Plan, and disparate impact liability in fair housing do not involve
visible victims,287 likely a prime reason that the Court has not subjected them to
strict scrutiny. By contrast, disparate impact lawsuits containing racial quotas in
their remedial orders usually generate a significant amount of controversy.
To see how this is so, one would have to look no further than the cases of quota-
based remedial orders provided earlier in this Article.288 The Austin Firefighters’
Union, for example, strongly objected to the consent decree in United States v. City of
Austin,289 and even attempted to intervene in litigation.290 Union representatives com-
plained that they were strong-armed by city officials, who told them in collective
bargaining talks that if the city did not get what it wanted during the negotiations,
it would have to reach its objective by ceding to a sham lawsuit and achieve its
282 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 966 (1992).
283 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 792–802 (2011).
284 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 39, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (arguing that the University’s affirmative action program allows
“all students to experience concrete benefits from diversity” (citation omitted)).
285 See Mellott, supra note 158, at 1131–57.
286 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“Classifications
based on race . . . lead to a politics of racial hostility.”).
287 See Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 109, at 1369–75.
288 See supra notes 124–68 and accompanying text.
289 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Austin, No. 1:14-CV-00533-LY (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 7, 2014).
290 Michael King, Point Austin: . . . And Two Steps Back, AUSTIN CHRON. (July 4, 2014),
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2014-07-04/point-austin-and-two-steps-back/
[http://perma.cc/9YBX-BKJU].
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desired ends through a consent decree with the Department of Justice.291 Three
hundred firefighters stood against the decree at the city council debate, and the union
president accused the city manager of intentionally framing the matter as a “race
issue” to intimidate members of city council to vote for it.292
Similarly, in United States v. New Jersey,293 an officer sought the public’s help in
filing objections to the decree, which overturned the “promotions of three Teaneck
police officers to the rank of sergeant.”294 The officer noted his frustration that the entire
decree was based on “one man’s opinion” and that the declarations alleging the dispa-
rate impact did “not appear in the [consent] decree.”295 In the face of public pressure,
the Department of Justice eventually allowed the officers to keep their promotions.296
D. Context
“Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the
Equal Protection Clause.”297 It is clear that virtually every Justice on the current
Court is willing to apply limited context-based exceptions to the general rule that all
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.298 In Parents Involved, Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg argued that the Court’s precedents on race-based
decisions in higher education were inapplicable in the context of K–12 school
assignments.299 Similarly, Justices Thomas and Scalia have endorsed domain-based
exceptions to standard equal protection jurisprudence in prisons. In Johnson v.
291 Id.
292 Bob Nicks, City Council Consent Decree Vote Result, AUSTIN SAFETY FIRST (May 20,
2014), http://www.austinsafetyfirst.org/news-updates/city-council-consent-decree-vote-results
[http://perma.cc/VF5G-A2XB].
293 No. 10-cv-91, 2012 WL 3265905 (D.N.J. June 12, 2012).
294 Jerry DeMarco, Teaneck Sergeants Keep Their Promotions in Justice Department
Ruling, S. PASSAIC DAILY VOICE (Nov. 1, 2011) [hereinafter DeMarco, Teaneck Sergeants
Keep Their Promotions], http://southpassaic.dailyvoice.com/police-fire/teaneck-sergeants
-keep-their-promotions-in-justice-department-ruling/628135/ [http://perma.cc/84Y7-NU5M].
295 Jerry DeMarco, Teaneck Sergeants Demoted in Federal Discrimination Suit Seek
Public’s Help, S. PASSAIC DAILY VOICE (Oct. 23, 2011), http://southpassaic.dailyvoice.com
/police-fire/teaneck-sergeants-demoted-in-federal-discrimination-suit-seek-publics-help
/629667/ [http://perma.cc/E3WL-PZKK].
296 DeMarco, Teaneck Sergeants Keep Their Promotions, supra note 294.
297 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954) (“We must consider public education in the light of its full development
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”); Richard A. Epstein, Rand
Paul’s Wrong Answer, FORBES (May 24, 2010, 12:48 PM), http:// www.forbes.com/2010/05
/24/rand-paul-rachel-maddow-opinions-columnists-richard-a-epstein.html [http://perma.cc
/9VXU-P6A7] (arguing that Rand Paul’s misguided attack on Title II of the Civil Rights Act was
based upon a misunderstanding of “libertarian theory in its proper social and historical context”).
298 Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting), with Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 524 (2005) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
299 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 843 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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California, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to an unwritten policy by the
California Department of Corrections that segregated prisoners on the basis of race.300
In dissent, Justice Thomas made a context-specific argument for a more deferential
form of review, reasoning that “whatever the Court knows of administering educa-
tional institutions, it knows much less about administering penal ones.”301
City of Oneonta provides an example of a context-based ruling. Allowing the
police to use race in determining whom to question reflects a concern that a contrary
rule would bog down police investigations in emergencies.302 In this area, natural
incentives push the police away from making discriminatory actions. Namely, the
police department’s interest in efficient work and a police officer’s interest in appre-
hending the perpetrator make race neutrality the baseline, at least where the plain-
tiffs themselves did not allege any racial animus.303
This argument does not apply with as much force in the context of remedial
orders containing racial quotas. Ricci shows that municipal governments will often
have different incentives, and Justice Alito’s concurrence in the case highlighted the
concerns with racial politics.304 Those anxieties are heightened with disparate impact
liability, which generally allows for a significant amount of prosecutorial discretion
and generates plenty of news coverage.305 Ricci isn’t the only authority on this point,
as it is widely acknowledged that many city officials welcome disparate impact chal-
lenges so that they could achieve their policy objectives through court orders and
consent decrees.306
Moreover, courts are hesitant to double-check the government’s homework in
situations where the government must engage in continual line drawing.307 New
300 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506–09.
301 Id. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
302 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392–94 (1978) (“The need to protect or preserve life
or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency
or emergency.” (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. App. 1963))).
303 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In this case, plaintiffs
do not sufficiently allege discriminatory intent.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001).
304 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 598–602 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
305 See supra notes 282–95 and accompanying text.
306 Selmi, supra note 32, at 764–67; see also Richard Primus, Of Visible Race-Con-
sciousness and Institutional Role: Equal Protection and Disparate Impact After Ricci and
Inclusive Communities, in TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 67TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR JUNE 5–6, 2014, at
ch. 17 (Anne Marie Lofaso & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2015) (“[M]any officials in the Nation’s
large cities have been happy to be sued on disparate-impact theories, especially when the
result is a negotiated consent decree that gives local officials judicial cover for racially inte-
grative (or otherwise racially allocative) policies that might have been difficult to pursue without
the overlay of judicial compulsion.”).
307 See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“The[ ] restraints on
judicial review have added force ‘where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process
of line-drawing.’” (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980))).
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schools are built all the time, and new lines must be drawn every time that happens.
The frequency with which new schools are being built weighs against applying strict
scrutiny.308 If every new school were to trigger strict scrutiny, school districts would
be incentivized not to build new schools in the first place. That rule would increase
overcrowding in schools around the United States.309 Applying strict scrutiny when-
ever a decision is made with awareness of race is also unworkable in the context of
police investigations. The police regularly use suspect descriptions to hunt down
perpetrators,310 and even a policy requesting a general description of a suspect might
often garner information about the suspect’s race. Sympathetic to the difficulties of
policing and cognizant of the unavailability of feasible alternatives,311 courts forced
to apply strict scrutiny might routinely uphold incidental uses of race in suspect de-
scriptions while pretending to apply stringent review. Courts are thus hesitant to apply
strict scrutiny knowing that doing so will lead to one of two undesirable outcomes:
hampering police functions or diluting judicial review.312
These considerations do not, however, point toward deferential review for reme-
dial orders containing racial quotas. The Court recently suggested a feasible alterna-
tive that has already been used in Title VII disparate impact lawsuits313: a remedial
order that prospectively enjoins the practice causing the disparate impact, but does
not reallocate opportunities on the basis of race.314
308 Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)
(“[T]he most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of
historical precedent . . . .” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting))).
309 See, e.g., Rachel Lebeaux, Legislature Restores $500K to Address Ashland Schools
Overcrowding, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals
/west/2015/08/04/legislature-restores-address-ashland-schools-overcrowding/lgi4qrDQ30Z
wmL9JiHbt2N/story.html.
310 See, e.g., Jerod MacDonald-Evoy, Phoenix Police Look for Suspect in Woman’s
Stabbing, AZCENTRAL (Aug. 16, 2015, 4:12 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local
/phoenix/breaking/2015/08/16/phoenix-police-stabbing-suspect/31825511/ [http://perma.cc
/KEX7-MZ7W] (police described the suspect as “Native American, with a tattoo above his
right eye”).
311 Cf. Bela August Walker, Note, The Color of Crime: The Case Against Race-Based
Suspect Descriptions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 683 (2003) (“As an alternative to racial
descriptors, this Note proposes development of a Universal Color Complexion Chart. Such
a chart would consist of ten to twenty skin tones covering the spectrum of human coloring,
with a swatch for each color, in a manner similar to a paint chart.”).
312 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J., concurring)
(“[I]t trivializes strict scrutiny by applying it in routine circumstances in which the conduct
scrutinized will be routinely validated.”).
313 See, e.g., NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 470–71 (3d Cir.
2011) (injunctive relief).
314 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2522–23 (2015).
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CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, court decisions regarding the census, suspect descriptions,
school zoning, and now fair housing will likely serve as fodder for those advocating for
the far-reaching remedy of racial quotas in disparate impact litigation under Title VII.
But those who apply the equal protection principles from those decisions should read-
ily come to the conclusion that racial quotas in disparate impact remedial orders will
be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
First, disparate impact remedial orders involving racial quotas impermissibly allo-
cate on the basis of race. In stark contrast to disparate impact remedies in fair housing,
which have only been used to impose race-neutral measures, remedial orders involving
racial quotas in employment directly allocate goods on an explicitly racial basis.
Second, remedial orders containing racial quotas, because of their explicit men-
tion of race, carry much greater expressive harm than remedies that are race-neutral.
As the Court has said time and again, explicitly racial measures often reveal imper-
missible government viewpoints and stigmatize even those who benefit from racial
preferences. Thus, remedial orders like the one found in the City of Austin case should
be subject to strict scrutiny.
Third, the principle of universalism does not warrant deferential review for
quota-based remedies in disparate impact. The pluralistic costs are minimal in cases
in which the courts have applied deferential review, but disparate impact remedial
orders with racial quotas have generally led to, unseemingly, “race wars” in cities
across the United States.
Fourth, court decisions on the use of race in police investigations and zoning de-
cisions can be explained by context, including the inevitable occurrence of such acts,
and the lack of workable alternatives. But there is no reason to think that an employer
must resort to racial quotas in Title VII disparate impact cases, since such extreme rem-
edies have been virtually non-existent in Fair Housing cases over the last forty years.
At the end of the day, courts will apply principles of burden allocation, expres-
sive harm, universalism, and context in determining the standard of review for a
race-conscious law. But just as those principles have allowed deferential review for
the census, suspect descriptions, and school zoning decisions, they command strict
scrutiny for explicit racial quotas found in some disparate impact remedial orders.
Such orders must be closely analyzed under the most stringent form of judicial review.
